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CHAPTER TEN 
WHERE THE VALUE LIES: 
THE IMPORTANCE OF MATERIALITY  
TO THE IMMATERIAL ASPECTS OF HERITAGE  
JOHN CARMAN 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Archaeology—once purely the province of students of the most ancient 
human societies, and generally perceived as focusing upon the deep past—
is today understood as a wider study, “an approach, a set of methods, ideas 
and perspectives which are used to investigate the past through its material 
remains” (Bailey et al. 2009, 2). Indeed for some, archaeology is not about 
the past at all, but instead can be seen as the science of studying material 
culture. As such, archaeologists are concerned for all classes of material, 
and in all its forms.  There is as much interest in studying an abandoned 
twentieth century Council flat (Buchli and Lucas 2001), a twentieth 
century protest camp, nuclear test facilities (Schofield et al. 2006) or road 
islands (roundabouts) and supermarkets (Graves-Brown 2007) as a 
Neolithic flint scatter or an Egyptian Old Kingdom tomb. The corollary is 
that there is as much interest in studying material from the distant past as 
in studying those objects that come from our own age. But archaeologists 
are interested in much more than “things”—the physical objects, materials 
and remains themselves. They are interested in the ideas, thoughts and 
social relationships in which these objects are embedded and which they 
represent—both in the past and in the present. Indeed, there is a very 
specific interest in the “life cycle” of such material amongst archaeologists, 
even as purely physical objects (see for example Schiffer 1972), and this 
interest brings even the most ancient object into the present (Schiffer 
1987; Gosden and Marshall 1999; Holtorf 2002). 
Archaeologists, then, study material culture from the past, but are 
equally interested in it as a part of our present. In doing so, archaeology is 
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a discipline concerned with the very nature of material culture—both as 
“material” and as that elusive phenomenon called “culture”. No other 
discipline combines such interests. This is an argument for retaining 
archaeology as a key contributor to the study of heritage and its 
understanding—and here, “heritage” is always to be understood not as a 
gift from the past but as a creation of the present. This paper will seek to 
make the argument for the involvement of archaeology in heritage by 
approaching it from apparently contradictory, but nevertheless linked, 
directions: that heritage is inevitably more intangible a phenomenon than 
tangible, and yet that its intangibility needs to attach to something tangible 
in order to exist at all. In doing so, this chapter will address the 
intangibility of the tangible and the tangibility of the intangible.  
Castles of Stone  
There is perhaps no more tangible heritage object than the castle of 
brick or stone. Castles are a widespread type of structure: they are found 
all over the world, built of all kinds of materials. They generally fall 
within the category of “heritage” because few cultures build or use castles 
any more and they have an abundant capacity for survival: they tend to be 
fairly robust structures. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1: Sedan Fortress, France 
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The great fortress at Sedan in north-eastern France dates from the 
thirteenth century, and it was developed to meet new challenges and new 
technologies of siege warfare from then until the twentieth century (Figure 
10.1). At its height—in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—it was 
nearly treble its present size and was for a long part of its history the 
largest fortress in Europe. It never fell to siege or assault, and played a part 
in every major war in Western Europe from the fifteenth to the twentieth 
centuries: only the advent of long-range artillery and air-power made it 
obsolete as a site of defence. It is remembered particularly for the great 
battle that was fought around it in 1870, as part of the Franco-Prussian 
conflict of that year, the last of the so-called Wars of German Unification. 
The battle at Sedan ranks sufficiently high in local, and indeed French 
national, memory to have an entire room devoted to it in the museum 
contained within the fortress. Sedan is located within France and 
represents the final victory of that war of German over French troops, and 
yet the event is celebrated in a monument in the town square, in other 
monuments elsewhere and especially in the nearby military cemetery with 
a large obelisk.  
These monuments do not mark French success, as do many military 
monuments, but instead the valour of French soldiers and the suffering of 
both soldiers and civilians at the hands of the invader. The current obelisk 
at Sedan is not the original that was first raised in the 1890s: it is a 
replacement raised after the Second World War when again Sedan fell to 
German forces. In 1941, the original was destroyed and replaced with a 
German monument in suitable neo-classical (even brutalist) style overtly 
celebrating a German victory on what was then seen (at least by the 
German high command) as German soil. The increasingly dilapidated 
condition of the Nazi monument testifies to the attitude now taken towards 
it by the Sedan authorities. 
All these objects—the fortress, the French and German memorials, and 
other sites in the area that recall the battle—are tangible objects that are 
also solid and robust: but this is, of course, not the significance they carry. 
Their status as “historic monuments” or as “heritage” lies instead in the 
ideas they represent, which are alternative ideas about a past event that in 
itself is now unrecoverable in any physical sense and therefore quite 
intangible. At Sedan, to the intangibility of past action is added the 
intangibility of ideas about that past action—of valour in defeat, of claims 
to territory, of long-term rivalry between France and Germany. Those rival 
ideas themselves—in an era of European integration (or at least 
cooperation)—now find their place as part of the past: this is intangibility 
squared, as ideas about ideas also become part of the shared past.  
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Figure 10.2: A model of heritage 
 
The idea that there is less that is “tangible” about heritage than there is 
“intangible” is not new. Heritage, to put it simply, is something (or a 
group of somethings) “promoted” out of the everyday to a special 
cognitive realm where we think about it differently. The origin for this 
model (discussed in more detail in Carman 2002, 167–175; 2005c, 51–53) 
lies in Michael Thompson’s Rubbish Theory (1979). This offers a 
mechanism for this “promotion” process out of one cognitive category of 
material to another, via his third category of rubbish, which is material we 
choose to treat as if it is not there. For Thompson, material is “real” but 
what makes things what they are is not their physical form but the ideas 
we have about them. The same applies in Jean Baudrillard’s (1981) 
distinction between the realm of use and exchange values and of symbolic 
values: any object is merely an object, but it becomes what it represents 
because of the way we treat it and think about it. Accordingly, a simple 
gold finger-ring carrying a solitaire diamond as decoration given by a 
lover to his beloved on promise of marriage becomes a different object—
an “engagement ring”, carrying the particular association of the couple’s 
relationship and requiring the performance of specific rituals in its 
presence (the expression of a desire to view it, admiration and praise, the 
offer of congratulations). These ideas map rather well onto Pierre 
Bourdieu’s (1984) consideration of the interchangeability of, and people’s 
differential access to, economic and cultural capital. Here, “cultural 
capital” defines one’s status in the world and the ability to operate in 
particular social milieus, and also indicates one’s ability to distinguish 
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objects of cultural worth. The exchange of objects of cultural worth for 
economic value, or the ability to pay for expensive education, provides 
mechanisms by which the economic and cultural realms may interact.  
Heritage is therefore inevitably a realm of ideas rather than a collection 
of things. Any object can become a heritage object: it has nothing to do 
with the physical attributes of the object, but rather what we hold to be 
important about it. This is the same point that Cornelius Holtorf and Tim 
Schadla-Hall (2000) have made regarding “aura” and “authenticity”, that 
what we think about objects depends upon the contemporary context: the 
“authentic replica” or “authentic reproduction” can really exist and can be 
valued as much—and sometimes more—than an “authentic original”. An 
object does not have to be old—or even pretend to be—to be granted 
“heritage” status; and it does not have to be really what it purports to be: 
fictional objects can be granted it too.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.3: Whiteworks 
 
The novelist Arthur Conan Doyle used Whiteworks on Dartmoor in 
southwest England as the model for his great Grimpen Mire in the 
Sherlock Holmes novel The Hound of the Baskervilles (Conan Doyle 
1902) (Figure 10.3). It was the site of lead mining from the seventeenth to 
early nineteenth centuries and, as a consequence, the area is a dangerously 
wet and marshy area with water-filled depressions and pits now overlain 
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by deceptively solid-looking plantlife. Despite its interest as a site of 
industrial heritage, it is as the Grimpen Mire that the place is frequently 
visited today: to the extent that one of the houses on the edge of the area 
carries a sign saying in very strong language that it is nothing to do with 
The Hound of the Baskervilles or, indeed, anything else Sherlockian, and 
please leave its inhabitants alone! Here, a fictional reference gives heritage 
status to a real location, but one which is not the real place visitors seek. 
What this ultimately means is that not only can the category of heritage 
include any object, it can include anything at all—not only the physical 
but also the ideational: and, as Michael Thompson (1979, 56) neatly puts 
it, it is not that “things are …  ideas, but that ideas are things”. 
Intangible Objects 
The point about heritage objects—what makes them heritage, rather 
than anything else—is that they represent intangible qualities we value. 
But heritage does not only consist of objects: it consists of memories of 
objects and of memories of activities. Douglas and Isherwood (1979, 37) 
refer to collective (corporate) saving as having an “otherworldly morality” 
because it extends the life of the collective beyond that of its individual 
members. Collectives—such as military regiments, for instance—do 
indeed have existences beyond that of their individual members. In the 
British army, it became traditional to consider the regiment as immortal, 
and individual soldiers traded their own finite lives for the immortality of 
the unit: in this way, however short or long their life with that unit, they 
too partook of that immortality. This is one reason why old soldiers (and 
young ones) become so upset when reorganizations of the armed services 
lead to the disappearance of their regiment: their claim on the future has 
been removed from them. In fact, the usual procedure is for the regimental 
tradition to attach itself to a smaller unit in a new formation, at company 
or platoon level.  
However, institutional descent need not be so direct to be recognized. 
At Cropredy Bridge in Oxfordshire (Figure 10.4), a stone tablet was 
placed in the 1930s at the site of a battle that took place in the 1640s. This 
object was created to stand for the memory of the event that was that 
battle: the intangible past event recalled only as intangible memory by the 
creation of a modern physical object. Each year at the spot, a re-enactment 
of the battle takes place by enthusiasts, some groups of whom claim an 
institutional descent from original participants by naming their 
“regiments” after those who fought on the day. Some of these regiments 
leave tokens—wreaths of flowers, perhaps—in memory of their fallen 
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“comrades” of three hundred years previously. This process—of placing 
the tablet, of re-enactment, of leaving tributes in remembrance—represents 
the reversal of the normal process of preserving objects from the past to 
represent intangible qualities. Here, instead, the intangible is represented 
by the creation of new objects. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.4: Memorial at Cropredy Bridge 
 
Battlefields themselves are also heritage objects. Oudenaarde in 
Belgium was the site of a great battle in the early eighteenth century. It is a 
typical battlefield landscape and, apart from a low mound which is all that 
remains of what was once a castle, it is a very empty and uninteresting 
piece of real estate. What battlefield preservation is aimed at—a point 
made strongly by a number of commentators, and especially Foard 
(2001)—is the memory of the now unrecoverable event rather than the 
material evidence of the event that may be present in that space: that these 
places matter as the place where a historic event took place, rather than as 
archaeological sites. Hence one reason, I think, for the general lack of 
discussion of the ontology of such places in the literature (although on this 
see Carman 2005b) is that what they represent are not the places 
themselves or the objects they contain, but instead serve to evoke in the 
mind a past event. This is partly about remembrance and memorialization, 
but also about imagination and a kind of “fictionalizing” of the past by 
requiring the use of imagination alone as the mode of interpreting the 
event: this is because so little remains except the shape of the space, and 
sometimes not even that.  
Battlefield memorials are an interesting category of object in their own 
right (Carman 2003; Carman and Carman 2006, 184–206). Like the example 
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from Cropredy, they mostly post-date the event by some time. There was a 
medieval preference for building churches on battlefields soon after the 
event, but this practice was abandoned by the sixteenth century and the 
raising of other kinds of memorials is a practice of later centuries still 
(Borg 1991). What they mark is no longer present and was of course only 
fleeting in any case. They also mark different kinds of things that are not 
present. A great church built at the town now called Batalha celebrates the 
Portuguese victory of Aljubarotta fought several kilometres away and out 
of sight. A smaller monument at Tewkesbury marks that battle, but is now 
as likely to be used as a convenient location to park a bicycle. Both of 
these monuments commemorate the event particularly. 
Other monuments commemorate persons present at the battle they 
mark. Individual monuments may commemorate the death of individuals, 
such as that at Roliça in Portugal, in memory of Colonel Lake who fell in 
battle there in 1808. Groups may equally be remembered, such as the large 
numbers of mercenaries who died at in the battle of Stoke Field (1487) and 
marked by the stone in the nearby churchyard. Similarly, those who were 
present may be recalled, as for the Irish who fought for France at Fontenoy 
(1745) or those who fought for the allies at Corunna (1809).  Alternatively, 
the presence of a prominent individual may be marked, such as by the 
obelisk raised to King Louis XV of France, not on the battlefield of 
Fontenoy (1745) but at Cysoing, some two kilometres away, where he 
spent the nights before and after the conflict. All of these persons have of 
course gone: all are now deceased, and no visible evidence remains of 
them at the place where they are commemorated.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.5: Portuguese Tomb of the Unknown Soldier 
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Remembrance of the dead is a specific category of commemoration. 
The Portuguese Tomb of the Unknown Soldier, commemorating World 
War One in particular, is located in the great church at Batalha, which 
itself commemorates war from six centuries earlier (Figure 10.5). More 
modest memorials to the dead of World War One can be found in the 
streets of St Albans, England, the site of a battle five centuries earlier. 
These memorials to the dead of modern conflicts sit away from the 
locations of that conflict, remembering not only people who are gone but 
also the distant events that took them. 
Heritage sites, objects and places thus represent not things but the 
memory of things. The things they act to remember are always things that 
are gone: events, activities, people collectively or individually. They carry 
ideas and associations and values that are not concrete and cannot be 
measured or assessed in concrete terms: the physical description of a 
place, object or site is not a statement of its value or meaning. Beyond the 
memory of things, some represent the memory of the memory of things. 
All these fall into the category of the “intangible”. When we talk about 
heritage, then, we are inevitably in a realm of the intangible: the idea of 
there being a “tangible” heritage, which is somehow distinct from an 
“intangible” one, is a shibboleth and a myth we need to move away from.  
Paradoxically, the recognition of those intangible qualities as crucial to 
the category of “heritage” by official agencies also invites us to consider 
the role of those who engage with materiality in a new light. The next 
section will highlight how recent discussions of “heritage value” have 
sought to turn intangible qualities into tangible form. 
New Heritage Values 
We live in what has been termed the “Audit Society” (Power 1997), in 
which we are required to place a measurable value upon all things. The 
corollary, however, is that only those things that are measurable can be 
measured. It follows, then, that only those attributes the value of which is 
measurable are considered valuable. At the service of such ill-defined but 
contextually relative terms as “effectiveness”, “efficiency” and 
“accountability” we find ourselves bound to offer tangible and measurable 
justifications for the preservation and custodianship of cultural heritage.  
Recent initiatives in valuing cultural heritage reflect these aspects of 
the Audit Society. In 2005, English Heritage and other agencies 
commissioned a report from an environmental economics consultancy on 
Valuation of the Historic Environment (eftec 2005). Its opening statement 
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is “Heritage assets are economic goods” because—like other economic 
goods—they provide “flows of wellbeing” (eftec 2005, 7). Rather than 
being concerned with activities, projects and programmes as its full title 
suggests it should, the report actually concerns itself with how one might 
assess the value of such “heritage assets”. In January 2006, the Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) for England and Wales published a “consultation 
document” on accounting for such “heritage assets” (ASB 2006), which 
would require a full financial valuation of such objects to be included in an 
institution’s balance sheet as assets. Despite arguments against such a 
move on a number of grounds—some ethical, some practical, some 
grounded in accounting technicalities, and some a mixture of two or more 
of these—the ASB has since published its statement of how to account for 
such objects in financial terms 
In a parallel development, the Heritage Lottery Fund commissioned the 
think-tank DEMOS to help them reconsider the evaluation of heritage 
projects, especially in light of new ideas about “public value” (DEMOS 
2005). This was followed up by a conference early in 2006 where ideas 
about the concept of “public value” were explored (Clark 2006) (Figure 
10.6). The concept of “public value” was presented to us as a measure of 
“what the public value” and as the space of interaction between three types 
of value. The first is so-called “intrinsic” value, which represents the 
meanings and associations carried by the cultural heritage: in other words, 
its academic research potential, and its symbolic and associational values. 
The second is so-called “instrumental” value, which represents the kinds 
of benefits that accrue to a community or to society in general from 
maintaining or using a site or monument: these could be in terms of tourist 
potential, or economic regeneration; in other words, its amenity value. The 
third is so-called “institutional” value, which derives from the activities of 
the organization responsible for managing or using the site or monument 
or place: these were defined in terms of “how organizations relate to their 
publics [and includes] creating trust and mutual respect between citizens 
… and providing a context for sociability and the enjoyment of shared 
experiences” (Hewison and Holden 2006, 15, emphasis in original). While 
it was recognized that “instrumental” and “institutional” values would 
represent tangible returns that can be measured, albeit with some 
difficulty, it was generally agreed that the measurement of “intrinsic” 
cultural value was inherently more problematic. The general feeling was 
that this was the province of heritage professionals such as art and 
architectural historians, and archaeologists.  
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Figure 10.6: The “public value” triangle (Source: Hewison and Holden 2006, 15) 
 
Both these attempts at valuation—in financial terms (ASB 2006) and 
in terms of “Public Value” (Clark 2006)—represent efforts at turning the 
value of the cultural heritage into tangible, measurable terms. For the ASB 
this takes the form of a straightforward accounting exercise. The “Public 
Value” schema incorporates other forms of valuation, but essentially 
reduces heritage to a purely utilitarian object, relegating its “cultural” 
values to the (largely immeasurable) “intrinsic” category. 
The Role of Archaeology 
By contrast with the ASB and “Public Value”, the usual approaches to 
valuation of the archaeological resource serve the interests of archaeology 
as a discipline and as a field of activity. As Tim Darvill (2005, 39) has put 
it, measures of archaeological importance are an “interest group 
Intrinsic 
Instrumental Institutional 
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methodology applicable to specific elements of the resource, in order to 
allow some kind of ranking or discrimination”. These can be contrasted 
with the more generally-held “value schemes” of wider society, which, he 
argues, are constructed of almost perfectly opposite elements, but with 
which they are linked to professional schemes of value in a hermeneutic 
circle (Darvill 2005, 37–9). Any accounting or financial scheme similarly 
serves the interests of institutional accountability in order to allow 
comparison between the relative effectiveness of different bodies 
responsible for stewardship of the heritage. It, too, is an “interest group 
methodology” in Darvill’s terms—serving the interests of the accounting 
and audit community. And, despite its name and rhetoric, the scheme of 
Public Value proposed by DEMOS and others is equally unrelated to the 
relationship of actual people to their pasts. The one group not considered 
here are indeed real people: intrinsic, instrumental and institutional values 
are all kinds of abstracted, bureaucratic measures, detached from any sense 
of personal or group affinity to object or place. Yet the great lesson of 
surveys of public attitudes to the heritage (for example, English Heritage 
2000) is precisely that sense of “belonging” which is central to the whole 
idea of having a heritage. Paradoxically this was an aspect strongly 
emphasized at the Capturing the Public Value of Heritage conference 
(Clark 2006), but remains excluded from the practice of policy—either 
public or disciplinary—as opposed to statements of intent (see for instance 
English Heritage 2000; DCMS 2001)  
The experience of archaeologists, however, indicates an alternative 
way forward. Bill Boyd and his colleagues in Australia identified the 
processes by which professional interest in sites engendered the 
development of local interests and values built around a site’s various 
attributes and different constituencies (Boyd et al. 2005, 98–107). They 
show how local Aboriginal interests mostly focussed upon sites 
representing Indigenous and traditional attitudes to land and environment, 
or to the history of their engagement with incoming colonizers. European 
Australians also recognized such claims and sometimes the spiritual 
dimension these indicate. Others, however, were more concerned with 
current social and economic uses—as tourist sites, recreational space, or 
thoroughfares—although not all of these necessarily conflicted with 
Aboriginal conceptions: the attitude of skateboarders to a rock-art site, for 
instance, could be seen as another example of the site’s significance to a 
particular subculture (Boyd et al. 2005, 107), and indeed a close alliance 
was thereby forged between these otherwise quite different groups. It was 
by raising questions about such places from an archaeological and 
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ethnographic perspective that values were ascribed that marked their 
importance to inhabitants of the locality and beyond.  
The same set of processes was evident at the Hilton of Cadboll site in 
Scotland (Jones 2004). Here, excavation of the lower portion of an 
inscribed Pictish stone and its reconstruction ignited controversy over the 
ownership and placement of the reunited object, which was claimed both 
by the national museum in Edinburgh and the locality. Investigation of the 
contexts within which contemporary meanings for the stone are created 
identified a complex set of interlocking values. Academic and intellectual 
values included those of archaeology, art history, folklore and oral history 
(Jones 2004, 27–33). In parallel to these, there was a more symbolic sense 
of its identity, as a living part of the community, and as an object “born” 
into the locality (Jones 2004, 33–7). As such, it at once belongs to the 
community, is part of it and also constitutive of it: “as well as being 
conceived of as a living member of the community, the monument is also 
simultaneously an icon for the [community] as a whole” (Jones 2004, 37). 
This extends into the monument’s role in the construction of a sense of 
place, and indeed of re-forging a “lost” sense of community cohesion 
(Jones 2004, 39) that can be “healed” (at least symbolically) by reuniting 
the two original pieces of the monument. 
These are ideas about “cognitive ownership”, defined by Boyd and his 
colleagues (2005, 93) as “a deliberately provocative term designed to 
focus attention on the diversity of socially-constructed values which may 
be identified for any cultural place [and] refers to the interest in or 
association with a site claimed … by any person or group”, specifically 
emphasizing the diversity of such associations that may co-exist 
simultaneously or change over time. Such notions inevitably relate closely 
to what has been called elsewhere “social value”. This is a measure of 
“collective attachment to place”, and places where this is evident have 
been conveniently defined—again by work in Australia (Johnston 1992, 
7)—as those which “provide a sense of connection with the past, tie the 
past affectionately to the present, provide an essential reference point in a 
community’s identity or sense of itself, help give a disempowered group 
back its history, and provide a sense of collective attachment to place”. 
Such places “loom large in the daily comings and goings of life” and are 
“places where people gather” (Johnston 1992: 7).  
Sites such as Hilton of Cadboll (Jones 2004) and those cited by Boyd 
and his colleagues (2005) clearly fall within this category. It is clear that 
the kinds of values that are ascribed to such places are multiple and can be 
conflicting, but at the same time, none necessarily prevent the ascription of 
other values to the same object at the same time. Accordingly, intellectual 
Where the Value Lies 
 
205 
and academic values can sit alongside popular, economic, recreational and 
tourist values. This means that “cognitive ownership” may allow each 
claimant to a resource full access to it without interference from or 
interfering with access by others. By giving full reign to such cognitive 
claims, each can take from the resource without placing any restraint upon 
similar taking by others. It is not so much of a stretch from here to the 
exercise of a voluntary physical restraint on actual use of the resource so 
as not to deny it to others; in other words, a value-based conservation 
programme that is not entirely reliant upon bureaucratic structures, 
systems of reporting to public agencies and the measurement of tangible 
returns (Carman 2005a).   
Conclusion 
The significance of these examples is not that this sense of “cognitive 
ownership” automatically exists and only needs to be recognized (contra 
Clark 2006). Instead, the message of Hilton of Cadboll and of Boyd’s 
work in Australia is that the active interest shown by students of culture 
serves to create new values that are then ascribed by others to the material 
under study. These examples of “community” projects serve to emphasize 
the link between valuing the archaeological past and a feeling of 
“ownership” of that past. It is this aspect of the relations between people 
and objects from the past that is lacking in current initiatives, be they 
professional archaeological or accounting schemes, or schemes of “public 
value”. The paradox is that it is not those who have been talking and 
writing about schemes of archaeological value who have been able to 
provide a model that will counter the impact of “the audit society” on our 
work. Instead, it is among those who conduct community archaeology 
projects that we find what we seek. What we have failed to do is to 
translate the language of that work into the language of our own. 
What is clear is that archaeology creates real value—not just 
archaeological value, but other values too—by virtue of engendering 
interest in the focus of our work. Such newly created values—whether 
they relate to the uses to which a place may be put, or the sense of 
community it creates, or the unexpected links and alliances that emerge 
between diverse groups within and between communities (such as 
Aboriginal elders and teenage skateboarders)—are all equally valid and 
relevant to heritage conservation. The point of this for the argument of this 
chapter is that it is archaeologists who are creating these values—and that 
the values so created inevitably attach to material objects. While the value 
of heritage is always intangible, it is to tangible objects that they attach, 
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and the people best suited to deal with this tangible material are 
archaeologists.  
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